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In this paper, I compare the effects of job matching and job search on the 
wages of men and women by education level. I find that matching and search exert a 
strong influence on the wages of young men and women, providing support for 
matching theories that emphasize "job shopping" early in a worker's career. The 
matching-related differences in wage determination documented appear to be strongest 
across education groups -- not by sex. I find that numerous facets of the labor market 
process that I study look remarkably similar for more highly educated young men and 
women. My results indicate that though job matching and turnover are important in 
wage determination, they do not provide an explanation of the male-female wage gap 
that exists for more highly educated men and women. 
Keywords: Job Matching, Job Search, Male-Female Wage Gap 




I have shown in previous work (Royalty [1993]) that the turnover of women 
with a high school education or less differs significantly from the turnover of more 
highly educated women as well from the turnover of men of both education levels. It 
was shown that the turnover probabilities generated in multinomial probit estimations 
could be used to estimate the reservation wage profiles that form the basis of job 
matching and search models. That investigation of matching and search centered on 
the implications of these models for turnover patterns, but the problem was more 
generally formulated in terms of the possible contribution of differences in matching 
and search behavior to the gender wage gap. The finding that less educated (LHS) 
women differ from all others in their job matching behavior left on the table the ques­
tion of whether or not this difference in labor market behavior was a contributor to 
the wage gap between less educated men and women. In this paper, I address this 
question. 
Specifically, the question to be answered is: "Can differences in matching and 
search behavior help explain the male-female wage gap?" It is difficult to quantify 
the effects of matching and search on wages since there exists no quantifiable variable 
"_matching" or "search". There are observable variables, however that are correlated 
with the process of matching and search. By definition the process of matching and 
search occurs only through the accumulation of job tenure and labor market 
experience. Job matching models such as those of Jovanovic (Jovanovic [1979a], 
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[1979b], [1984]) focus on the learning and wage growth that occurs with tenure on 
the job. On-the-job search models such as Burdett [1978] concentrate on the location 
of high wage job matches with time in the labor market. By the very nature of the 
models, the wage gains that are predicted due to matching and search are correlated 
with tenure or experience since these gains cannot be realized without the 
accumulation of job tenure and labor market experience. 
Recent empirical work on matching and search has emphasized the bias in 
OLS wage equation coefficients on tenure and experience due to the correlation 
between these variables and unobserved match-specific productivity (Altonji and 
Shakotko [1987], Abraham and Farber [1987], and Topel [1991]). The notion of 
bias employed in these papers is implicitly based on some concept of a "pure" tenure 
or experience effect on wages, an effect due solely to the accumulation of experience 
or tenure and unaffected by any relationship between these variables and the 
unobservable components of the wage. " 
The wage growth due to matching and search is attained by making optimal 
job and labor market turnover decisions. These turnover decisions produce the actual 
levels of job tenure and labor market experience that workers are observed to have 
accrued. Consequently, tenure and experience are inherently a part of the outcome of 
the matching and search process. It might be argued that the "bias" of OLS tenure 
and experience coefficients is really not a bias at all but merely another component of 
tenure and experience returns. Nonetheless, the formulation of the problem used by 
these authors -- correcting for the bias in OLS wage estimates due to job matching 
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and search -- can be used to provide evidence about the relative importance of 
matching and search in wage determination for men and women. As Topel points 
out, what these authors have defined as the OLS bias is also the extent to which 
experience and tenure are correlated with the unobservable matching and search 
component of wages. The size of these biases can be taken as indicative of the 
importance of matching and search in wage determination. 
I use the framework of Topel [1991] to estimate this bias, comparing the 
results for men and women. Briefly, the idea is first to obtain a consistent estimate of 
within job wage growth -- that is, an estimate of the total returns to experience and 
tenure during a job, purged of the effects of any correlation of experience and tenure 
with the unobservables. As will be described in detail below, a second stage 
estimation then provides an estimate of the correlation of tenure and experience with 
the unobservable component of wages that theory suggests is attained through 
matching and search. This is possible since the "pure" effect of these variables on the 
wage has been accounted for in the first stage of the estimation. This two-stage 
method yields a measure of the returns to matching and search through this estimate 
of the correlation of tenure and experienc~ with the job match component of the 
wage. In this paper, I will compare the matching and search returns for men and 
women by education level and explore various mechanisms that might explain the 
differences that are found. 
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Il. ESTIMATION METHOD 
Following Topel [1991], I now describe the two-stage estimation procedure used to 
obtain estimates of the returns to matching and search. The wage equation is 
specified as follows: 
(1) 
where wijt is the wage of person i at firm j at time t; Xi1 is the labor market 
experience of person i at time t; Tijt is the tenure of person i at firm j at time t; </>ijt is 
the match-specific productivity of person i at job j at time t; and Eijt is an iid error. 
Qijt is a vector of other observable variables, such as education, that are expected to 
enter the wage equation and that are included in empirical work. 
Due to the job matching and search processes, tenure and experience will be 
correlated with match-specific productivity, ¢. The learning theory of matching 
implies that a match with a high value of¢, <Prugh, will tend to last longer than a 
match with a low value of¢, <l>iow, because it is less likely that the wage based on the 
expected value of </>high will fall below the reservation value that would indicate that 
the worker should quit or that an alternative offer would exceed the reservation offer. 
This implies that tenure and </> will be positively correlated. 1 Search theory indicates 
that as individuals spend more time in the labor market searching they will tend to 
find better matches. Therefore there will also be a positive correlation between 
1Topel (Topel [1991]) points out that on-the-job search theory indicates that tenure and <f, may becorrelated for a different reason. Since searching workers take new jobs with higher average wages thanthe old, workers with short tenure may have recently found a high <f, match, resulting in a negativecorrelation between tenure and <f,. Empirical evidence of positive correlation between tenure and <f> indicatesthis phenomenon to be less important than that described by the matching model. 
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experience and <J>. Due to the correlation between the explanatory variables and the 
unobservables, OLS estimates of the returns to experience and tenure will include the 
effects of this correlation and will be biased estimates of the "pure" effect of tenure 
and experience on wages, measured by {3T and f3x respectively. 
In the first stage of this two-stage method, wage growth between consecutive 
years for people who have not changed jobs during that year is regressed on the 
change in the explanatory variables .over that year. The first stage regression equation 
is then: 
(2) 
where wijt=<Pijt+Eijt and Q'.. includes those variables of Q.. that vary with t.~ ~ If 
E[wt+1 - wJ = 0, OLS on equation (2) will provide consistent estimates of within job 
wage growth, B = f3x+ {3T, the combined effect of the accumulation of one year of 
tenure and experience during the course of a job.2 Only the combined effects of 
tenure and experience are identified here because tenure and experience are both 
incremented by one in each year. The first stage does identify separate effects of the 
higher order tenure and experience terms that are included in the empirical work. 
Since experience at time t is equal to initial experience upon entering this job 
(XOij) plus tenure on this job, the tenure and experience terms on the right-hand-side 
of equation (1) can be rewritten as /3xXOij + (/3x + {3T)T;jt• In the second stage of the 
2Notice that this specification does not allow for the learning about ¢ inherent in the full matchingmodel since it requires that E[w1+ 1 - w1] = 0. However, Topel [1991] and Topel and Ward [1992] presentevidence that wage innovations are serially independent, thereby justifying this first-stage estimator. 
I 
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estimation, B* T, the consistent estimate of the effect on the wage of tenure and 
experience during this job is subtracted from both sides of equation (1). The second 
stage dependent variable is then the current wage purged of the "pure" effects of 
tenure and experience since the start of this job. Therefore, subtracting B* T from 
both sides of equation (1) leaves: 
(3) 
where w\t is the log wage of person i at firm j at time t less the effect of tenure and 
experience (B * T) on this job and other time-varying variables (Q'.. ) as estimated in
I}/ 
the first stage; XO;j is the labor market experience of person i when s/he entered job j; 
and Q"ifr are the variables in Qj1 that do not vary over time. According to the search 
and matching theory employed in this paper, the OLS estimated coefficient on f3x 
from equation (3) provides an upper bound on the return to experience. It is an upper 
bound because search theory suggests that initial experience will be positively 
correlated with <I> since people with a longer time in the labor market will be more 
likely to have found better matches. 3 A lower bound on the return to tenure is then 
3The consistency of the other second stage estimates depends on the assumption that the otherexplanatory variables are independent of ¢;j,• 
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obtained by subtracting the second-stage estimate of the return to experience from the 
consistent first-stage estimate of the return to tenure and experience.4 
A measure of the importance of matching in wage formation, which is the 
primary focus of this paper, can be found by considering the following auxiliary 
equation: 
(4) 
Equation (4) incorporates matching and search notions by specifying that job-specific 
productivity, ¢ij1, will be correlated with both tenure and experience. Search theory 
suggests that ffiexv > 0 .since a longer time in the market yields better job matches. 
Matching theory implies that m1en > 0 since higher productivity, higher wage matches 
will tend to have longer tenures. 5 Substituting equation (4) into equation (1) shows 
that m1en and mexp are equal to the bias of OLS coefficient estimates on tenure and 
experience respectively. Although the two cannot be separately identified, their sum, 
m = m1en + mexp, can be estimated. This estimate of m can be understood to be the 
total return to matching and job search since it represents the extent to which · 
matching and search contribute to the unobservable match-specific component of the 
wage through tenure and experience. 
4The primary focus of this paper is on the returns to matching and search reported in the text belowbut the full tables of first and second stage estimates and a discussion of these results can be found inAppendix C. 
5As mentioned above, under certain conditions on-the-job search theory also has a different implicationfor the sign of m.,.. As workers search for better matches they tend to gain from changing jobs. Workerswho have recently changed jobs have on average higher wages and lower tenures, implying m.,. < 0.Therefore, technically, mien is unsigned, although the literature on job matching has generally assumed it tobe positive for the reasons stated in the text. The available evidence also supports this assumption (Topel[1991], Topel and Ward [1992]). 
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Substituting the right-hand-side of equation (4) for the <I> in equation (3) leaves: 
(5) 
Therefore, an estimate of wage growth bias due to matching and search, m = m1en + 
mcxp, can be obtained by including tenure as a regressor in the second stage 
estimation. 
ill. ESTIMATES OF RETURNS TO MATCHING & SEARCH 
The results on turnover from previous work (Royalty [1993]) suggest that it is 
important to divide the sample by education level when attempting to analyze possible 
differences in the matching and search behavior of men and women. The following 
table summarizes the results for men and women by education group. (The data are 
described in Appendix A.) Education levels here and elsewhere in the paper are 
abbreviated as education less than or equal to high school (LHS) and education 
greater than high school (GHS). 6 These estimates imply increases in wages due to 
matching and search ranging from 2.6% to 7.5% per year for these young men and 
young women. These estimates stand in contrast to Topel's estimate of this same 
parameter for men of 0.002. The much larger estimates of m found here suggest that 
in this sample of young people, matching and search are much more important than in 
Topel' s older PSID sample. These results provide support for matching theories that 
6At other points the abbreviations LHSF, GHSF, LHSM, and GHSM are used for females with lessthan or equal to a high school education, females with education greater than high school, males with lessthan or equal to a high school education, and males with education greater than high school. 
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emphasize the importance of "job shopping" early in a worker's career (Johnson 
[1978], Viscusi [1980]). 
Table I
Estimates of Return to Job Search Plus Matching*
m = mien + mexp
Standard Errors in Parentheses** 
Men Women 
LHS (Less than or 0.047 0.073
Equal to High School) (0.010) (0.010) 
GHS (Greater than 0.038 0.026
High School) (0.015) (0.012) 
* See Appendix B, Table B-1 for the complete list of estimated coefficients.
** Standard errors are corrected for two-stage estimation with the method of
Newey [1984]. See Appendix D for details of the covariance correction. 
Table I shows that matching and search are of highest value to less educated women, 
increasing their wages by over 7.5% per year.7 Hypothesis tests of the equality of m 
for LHS women versus the other groups are rejected at a significance level of 0.01 
for LHSF versus GHSF, and 0.10 for LHSF versus LHSM and LHSF versus GHSM. 
Tests at standard significance levels cannot reject the equality of m for more highly 
educated men and women or for LHS men versus GHS men or women. 
The similarity of these results with those obtained in the investigations of 
turnover is marked. Once again, less educated women experience different outcomes 
than all other groups. In this case, it appears that their returns to matching and 
7The estimated coefficients reflect the effect of an explanatory variable on the log wage. Therefore an
estimated coefficient of 0.073 increases wages by over 7.5% per year since (e0·073 - 1) = 0.0757. 
search are higher than those of the other groups examined. Also, more highly 
educated women do not differ significantly from more highly educated men. In the 
remainder of this paper, I will explore possible reasons for these findings in the 
context of matching and search models and especially in light of the previous findings 
of differences in turnover patterns among groups. 
IV. WHY DO RETURNS TO MATCHING AND SEARCH DIFFER BY SEX 
AND EDUCATION? 
In the previous section, I found that the returns to matching and search as 
estimated by mwere significantly greater for less educated women than for GHS 
women and men of both education groups. In previous work (Royalty [1993]), I have 
also found that LHS women have a significantly higher probability of job-to­
nonemployment (JNE) turnover. This finding of higher JNE turnover for LHS 
females suggests that, depending on their average length of time spent in 
nonemployment, LHS women may have lower levels of actual labor market 
experience than do the other groups. This speculation is confirmed by the following 




Means of Labor Market Experience and Tenure





Males 5.565 1.766 
LHS 5.625 1.868 
GHS 5.482 1.623 
Females 5.127 1.715 
LHS 4.885 1.770 
GHS 5.373 1.660 
Perhaps the simplest explanation for the higher returns to matching and search for 
LHS women is that at low levels of experience the marginal return to search is 
higher. This explanation is in accordance with the job shopping models cited above 
that emphasize the importance of job search when workers are young. Since less 
educated women are more likely to leave the labor force for nonemployment, perhaps 
they remain in the early stages of job shopping longer in calendar time than the other 
groups who participate in the market more continuously. Constraining the returns to 
matching and search to be linear in experience and tenure might therefore produce 
higher estimated returns for less educated women. 
This proposition of non-linearities is easily tested by allowing equation (4) to 
include higher terms of tenure and/or experience. For example, including a quadratic 
in both tenure and experience, equation (4) can be rewritten as: 
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(6) 
This addition implies that higher order terms of tenure and experience should be 
included in the second stage estimations. 8 Rewriting the second stage estimating 
equation (5) we have in this case 
Returns to matching and search will in this case be composed of the coefficients on 
tenure and these higher order terms. Three additional second stage estimations were 
performed. Model I included tenure and tenure-squared. Model 2 included tenure 
and experience-squared. And Model 3 included tenure, tenure-squared, and 
experience-squared. The relevant results from Model 3 are presented below and the 
full model results are included in Table B-2 in Appendix B.9 
8Higher order terms of tenure and experience are included in the first stage and the within job wagegrowth implied by these first-stage estimates is subtracted from the log wage to create w·. Therefore, thesecond stage estimated coefficients on tenure-squared and experience-squared should capture only the non­linearities in the returns to matching and search. 
9The results from Models 1 and 2 are not included since the test results are qualitatively similar tothose described below from Model 3, the most general of the three models. 
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Table III 




, mten2 , and mexp2
Second Stage Estimations
Standard Errors in Parentheses* 
LHS GHS LHS GHS
MEN MEN WOMEN WOMEN 
Tenure 0.139 0.034 0.213 0.083
(Coefficient is (0.034) (0.048) (0.031) (0.035) 
A A A )
ml =m,en +mexo 
Tenure2 -0.006 -0.006 0.000 -0.011
(Coefficient is (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.004)
m,en:i> 
Experience2 -0.005 0.004 -0.014 0.000
(Coefficient is (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000)
mg=) 
* Standard errors are corrected for two-stage estimation with the method of
Newey [1984]. See Appendix D for details of the covariance correction. 
Although some support is found for the proposition that non-linearities exist in the 
relationship between wages and time spent in matching and search, these results 
indicate that the higher return to matching and search for less educated women 
relative to the other groups is notdue merely to their lower levels of experience. 
· Each of the three models that included higher order terms of tenure and/or experience 
in the second stage estimations showed that LHS women have higher estimated 
returns to matching as estimated by m1, m1en2, and ~xp2 • Evaluating the returns for 
each group at the mean level of tenure and experience for GHS men, Model 1, which 
included tenure and tenure-squared, implies a cumulative return to matching and 
search to be 0.83 for LHS women, 0.60 for GHS women, 0.68 for LHS men, and 
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0.45 for GHS men. Model 2 implies this cumulative return to be 1.08 (LHSF), 0.25 
(GHSF), 0.84 (LHSM), and 0.09 (GHSM). These cumulative returns as estimated in 
Model 3 are 1.08 (LHSF), 0.56 (GHSF), 0.99 (LHSM), and 0.25 (GHSM). In the 
case of Model 3, the most general of the three models of non-linearity, Chi-squared 
tests reject the joint hypothesis of equality of the coefficients on tenure, tenure­
squared, and experience-squared for LHSF vs GHSF and LHSF vs GHSM at the 0.01 
significance level. The only change from the previous results is that the equality of 
returns for less educated men and women now cannot be rejected at a significance 
level of 0.10. 10 These findings indicate that I cannot attribute the higher returns for 
less educated women reported in Table I simply to higher marginal returns at lower 
levels of experience or tenure. 
A second possible explanation for the higher estimated returns to matching and 
search for less educated women involves adopting one concept from dual labor market 
theory. Dual labor market theories describe a labor market comprised of a secondary 
sector made up of low-paying, dead-end jobs and a primary sector made up of higher 
paying, career-oriented jobs. If two such sectors do exist, matching and search may 
play a role in movement by workers between sectors. 11 For example, workers might 
1°Tests of Model 1 and Model 2 produce similar test results. 
11Dual labor market theories emphasize labor market segmentation and the lack of movement by
secondary workers from the secondary sector to the primary sector. The lack of movement between sectors
is, in fact, a critical aspect of the formal segmented labor market theory making a matching and search
interpretation of the dual sectors questionable within this framework. Note, however, that one weakness of
dual labor market theory is its failure to explain adequately the source of this immobility of workers. My
empirical investigation therefore adopts only the concept that there might exist "good" and "bad" jobs within
the labor market and then explores the extent to which matching and search might contribute to movements
from "bad" to "good" jobs. See Taubman and Wachter [1986] for a review of the segmented labor market
literature. 
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more easily first find jobs in the secondary sector but continue to search on-the-job, 
looking for a better job in the primary sector. It might be conjectured that the 
movement from secondary jobs to primary jobs is more important to the wages of less 
educated workers if higher education allows easier access to primary jobs. Less 
educated workers might have to acquire work experience or skills in the secondary 
sector before gaining access to primary jobs while more highly educated workers do 
not. 
To investigate this issue, I first present two tables illustrating the distribution 
of this sample by occupational category. 12 Table IV shows that, as expected, the 
occupational distribution differs substantially by sex and education group. Men are 
more highly represented in the blue collar occupations and more educated men and 
women are more likely to be in skilled, white collar occupations. 13 
Some important differences are seen more clearly when the table is aggregated 
into the categories "skilled" and "unskilled". Table V indicates that as with many 
other labor market phenomena described and analyzed in this paper, more highly 
educated men and women look very much the same, while less educated women differ 
12One problem associated with dual labor market theory is identifying which jobs are primary and
which are secondary. Dickens and Lang [1985] present evidence that occupational breakdowns are more
descriptive of the dual labor market concept than are industry breakdowns. 
13The skilled blue collar category includes construction and protective service supervisors, firefighters,
craft and precision workers, mechanics, repairers and farm managers. The blue collar unskilled category
includes private household workers, guards, food servers, farm non-managers, machine operators (not
included as skilled), movers, laborers, and apprentices. The white collar skilled category includes
executives, administrators, accountants, architects, engineers, scientists, health professionals, teachers,
clergy, lawyers, artists, technicians, and retail sales supervisors. The unskilled white collar category
includes non-supervisor retail sales workers, recreation workers, non-clergy religious workers, typists,
clerks, receptionists, and messengers. 
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from the other groups. For example, 45 % of GHS men and women are in skilled 
occupations while only 24 % of LHS women fall into that category. 
Table IV
Percentage of Men and Women
in each Occupational Category* 
White White Blue Blue Total%
Collar Collar Collar Collar
Skilled Unskilled Skilled Unskilled 
Males 
LHS 8.5 9.3 28.5 53.7 100.0 
GHS 38.9 21.9 12.2 27.1 100.0 
Females 
LHS 24.1 29.5 2.6 43.8 100.0 
GHS 48.5 28.6 1.3 21.6 100.0 
*See footnote 13 for a breakdown of these categories. 
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Table V
Percentage of Men and Women
in Skilled and Unskilled Occupations* 
Unskilled Skilled Total% 
Males 
LHS 66.8 33.2 100.0 
GHS 54.8 45.2 100.0 
Females 
LHS 76.0 24.0 100.0 
GHS 55.4 44.6 100.0 
*See footnote 13 for a breakdown of these categories. 
In terms of matching and search behavior, the issue is not the static picture of 
the occupational distribution for men and women but rather whether or not that 
distribution changes differentially by group with experience in the labor market and 
whether or not less educated women benefit more from movement to different types 
of jobs. In order to examine this point, Table VI presents one simple measure of the 
movement between skilled and unskilled jobs by group at different levels of labor 
market experience. In each cell, the number to the left of the arrow is the proportion 
of the group (LHSM, GHSM, LHSF, or GHSF) in the category (unskilled or skilled) 
for workers with actual labor market experience of two years or less. The number to 
the right of the arrow is the same proportion for workers with experience of five 
years or more. 14 This table indicates that there is substantial movement between 
14Five years is approximately the sample mean of experience for each group. Experience of less thantwo years is used to represent the very early career years where occupational matching may not yet haveoccurred. 
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occupational categories in the early career years for each group. Only 10% of less 
educated women with less than two years of experience hold jobs in skilled 
occupations. Of those same women once they have attained at least five years of 
experience, 33 % hold skilled jobs. While this is a noticeable increase, the other 
groups also increased their ranks in skilled jobs as they spent more time in the labor 
market. This table cannot therefore answer the question as to whether the 
occupational distribution changes differentially by group in such a way as that 
increases the wages of one group relative to the others. To address that question, I 
now present results from OLS and two-stage wage regressions that include 
occupational dummy variables. In particular, I will examine whether or not the 
estimated returns to matching and search are affected by the inclusion of these 
occupational dummies. It is expected that, if occupational movement is largely 
responsible for matching and search wage gains, inclusion of occupational dummy 
variables in the second stage estimations will reduce the estimated returns to matching 
and search since the included occupational dummies will now pick up those effects. 
Before presenting those results, however, it should be noted that Table VI 
once again shows a remarkable similarity of GHS men and women. 35% GHS men 
with less than two years of experience are found in skilled jobs as compared to 33 % 
of GHS women. For GHS men with at least five years of experience the percentage 







Percentage of Men and Women
at Different Levels of Experience
Working in Skilled and Unskilled Occupations* 
Proportion in Category, Sample: Experience :5; 2-Proportion in Category, Sample: Experience ~ 5
(Number of Observations Represented by Each
Percentage in Parentheses) 
Unskilled Skilled 
Exv:5;2 - Exv>5 Exv:5;2 - Exv>5 
Males 
LHS 77% 62% 23% 38%
(221) (1892) (65 1174) 
GHS 65% 49% 35% 51%
(129) (997) (70) (1054) 
Females 
LHS 90% 67% 10% 33%
(507) (1334) (54) (666) 
GHS 67% 50% 33% 50%
(175) (1151) (87) (1145) 
*See footnote 13 for a breakdown of these categories. 
As stated above, if movement across occupations plays a substantial role in the 
matching and search process, a process proxied by tenure and experience, then it is 
expected that the inclusion of the occupational dummies would affect the estimated 
returns to experience and tenure. Before proceeding to the second stage estimations 
of the returns to matching and search, occupational dummy variables were added to 
OLS wage regressions. The results are reported in Table B-6 in Appendix B. For 
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each group these dummy variables are significant. It is generally found that workers 
in white collar skilled jobs and in blue collar skilled jobs receive higher wages than 
those in blue collar unskilled jobs. However, the premium to workers in white collar 
unskilled jobs relative to blue collar unskilled jobs is significant only for women. 
When I compare the coefficients on tenure and experience when occupational 
dummies are included in the estimation to those estimated without the occupational 
dummies (reported in Table B-5 in Appendix B) I find insignificant changes in the 
estimates. It is also interesting to note that the improvement in the R2 with the 
inclusion of the occupation dummies is greater for higher education men and women 
than for their less educated counterparts. These two findings make it seem 
improbable that occupational movement explains the previously reported finding that 
less educated women receive the highest returns to matching and search. 
Exploration of this issue continues by the addition of occupational dummies to 
the two-stage estimations described above. Estimates of m, the return to matching 
and search, with these variables included are reported in Table VII below. Other 
coefficient estimates from this regression are reported in Table B-3 in Appendix B. 
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Table VII
Estimate of Return to Job Search Plus Matching*
m = mien + mexp
Occupational Dummy Variables Included in Estimation






* See Appendix B, Table B-3 for the complete list of estimated coefficients.
** Standard errors are corrected for two-stage estimation with the method of
Newey [1984]. See Appendix D for details of the covariance correction. 
As compared to the original estimates reported in Table I above, these estimates of 
the return to matching and search are smaller for each education and sex group. 
Although this finding provides some evidence that occupational movement may play a 
part in generating returns to matching and search, tests cannot reject the equality of 
the estimates reported in Table VII with the original estimates of Table I for any of 
the four groups. Also these results cannot provide an explanation for the higher 
returns to matching and search for less educated women since this group continues to 
receive higher returns than the other groups even once the occupational dummies are 
included in the estimation. It appears from this examination that movement across 
occupations may be related to the gains to labor market search but that this movement 
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and its associated wage gains are not substantially related to education nor are they 
the only source of the returns to matching and search. 15 
Less educated women have very different job and labor market turnover 
patterns than do more highly educated women and men of both education groups 
(Royalty [1993]). This fact seems crucial in the continuing search for an 
understanding of the reasons behind the higher estimated returns to matching and 
search found thus far for LHS women. The most prominent difference in turnover 
patterns for this group is their higher job-to-nonemployment turnover. 
Higher than average job-to-nonemployment turnover could imply that a worker 
is not operating within the framework assumed by the prototypical search and 
matching models. These models assume that a worker's job mobility is unconstrained 
and unaffected by any individual heterogeneity in the value of non-market time. The 
wage gains due to matching and search that are predicted by these models are based 
on unconstrained workers who have no reason to be in the nonemployment state other 
than to search for a good job. High job-to-nonemployment turnover due to reasons 
not taken into account in these models, such as leaving the labor force temporarily to 
have children, could lower the returns to time spent in the matching and search 
process. The returns to matching and search estimated in the two-stage procedure 
used in this paper rely on years of tenure and experience to proxy the matching and 
search processes. Workers who stop these processes in mid-stream by leaving the 
15Note that this analysis of wage gains due to occupational mobility does not take into account the
possible endogeneity of the occupational choice of the worker. 
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labor force may not receive the same returns to matching and search per year as other 
workers. It may therefore be necessary to control for previous job-to-nonemployment 
decisions in order to estimate correctly the returns to matching and search. This. may 
be particularly important in the comparisons by group since the rate of turnover to 
nonemployment for less educated women is significantly different than that rate for 
the other three groups (Royalty [1993]). 
In order to test for the importance of differences in turnover patterns to the 
wage gains due to matching and search, I include in the two-stage estimations a 
variable intended to capture the intensity of the worker's matching and search history. 
To proxy the intensity of the worker's matching and search history I use a ratio that 
represents the time spent working full-time relative to time available since age 18. 16 
I will call this variable the full-time work ratio. By counting only jobs where hours 
worked were greater than fifteen per week, I control for one aspect of the intensity of 
the search and matching process. 17 By using a ratio of actual to potential 
experience, I control for previous job-to-nonemployment decisions. Since actual labor 
market experience is already included in the estimations, the addition of this new 
variable should give some indication of the importance to wages of a worker's history 
of previous labor market turnover decisions. 
16More precisely, this ratio is the number of weeks when the individual worked at least fifteen hours aweek since age 18 to number of weeks since the individual turned 18. Means of this variable by groups areas follows: 0.83 (LHSM), 0.74 (GHSM), 0.73 (LHSF), 0.71 (GHSF). 
17The use of this variable in the numerator of the ratio also avoids colinearity problems that could becaused by using the same actual experience variable used to define initial experience at the beginning of thejob. 
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The following table illustrates that previous turnover behavior is closely related 
to the estimated returns to matching and search. 
Table VIII 
Estimates of m =m +m
1 ten exp
Includes Full-time Work Ratio
Standard Errors in Parentheses* 
LHS GHS LHS GHS
MEN MEN WOMEN WOMEN 
Tenure 0.029 0.032 0.027 0.023
(Coefficient is (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) 
A A A )ml =mten +mexn 
Full-time 0.259 0.075 0.457 0.033
Work Ratio (0.058) (0.058) (0.054) (0.050) 
* Standard errors are corrected for two-stage estimation with the method of
Newey [1984]. See Appendix D for details of the covariance correction. 
First notice that the full-time work ratio has a positive and significant effect on the 
wages of LHS men and women. In contrast, the effect of this variable on the wages 
of GHS men and women is positive but insignificant. More importantly, the inclusion 
of this variable in the two-stage estimations has the predicted effect on the estimated 
returns to matching and search. Comparing these estimates (Table VIII) to those of 
Table I, one sees that the estimates of m for GHS men and women are almost 
unchanged while those for LHS men and women are substantially lower when the 
full-time work ratio is included in the regression. When this dummy variable is 
included, equality of the returns to matching and search cannot be rejected for any 
pair of the four groups. In fact, the estimates, m, are now remarkably similar for 
each sex and education group. 
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It should be noted, however, that the fact that the full-time work ratio does not 
significantly affect the wages of more educated men and women may be a result of 
the definition of this variable. This variable is defined relative to the worker's age. 
More highly educated men and women have spent time since age 18 in school and 
therefore the amount of full-time work since age 18 may be less important to their 
current wages than it is for less educated men and women. This definition was 
chosen, however, in order to avoid other problems in the interpretation of the 
coefficients that were deemed more serious than this one. Definitions of potential 
experience based on years since the end of schooling made it impossible to distinguish 
between the effect of education on the wages of GHS men and women and the effect 
of this alternate definition of the ratio of actual to potential experience. Nonetheless, 
I argue that the inclusion of this full-time work ratio serves the intended purpose -­
providing a measure of the intensity of the search and matching process -- especially 
for the two less educated groups for whom the amount of time in the nonemployment 
state appears to be exceptionally important. The similar estimated returns to matching 
and search found for each group when this full-time work ratio is included lends 
support to the contention that this variable is a useful indicator for the intensity of the 
matching and search process. The fact that the returns to matching and search are not 
statistically different for the four groups when this proxy for the intensity of the 
matching and search process is included in the estimation indicates that turnover out 
of the labor market plays an important role in the wage growth process under study. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper I find returns to matching and search that are significant and 
positive for all four sex and education groups. The effect of high job-to­
nonemployment turnover, and more generally the intensity of the search and matching 
process, has a significant effect on the wages of the less educated men and women. 
The inclusion of the full-time work ratio, used to proxy the intensity of the matching 
and search process, also lowers the estimated returns to matching and search for these 
two groups. Once this variable is included in the two-stage estimation, similar returns 
to matching and search are found for all four sex and education groups. In general 
the results are similar for less educated men and women and for more educated men 
and women but differ across education groups. 
The matching-related differences in wage determination documented appear to 
be strongest across education groups -- not by sex. The effect of matching and search 
on the wages of less educated men and women is similar. But the strong effect on 
wages of the full-time work ratio, especially for less educated women, indicates that 
matching and search may indeed play a role in explaining the wage gap between this 
group of men and women. On the other hand, I have found that numerous facets of 
the labor market process that I study -- turnover probabilities, estimated returns to 
matching and search, occupational movement, the effect on wages of the full-time 
work ratio -- look strikingly similar for more highly educated young men and women. 
It appears that though job matching and turnover are important in wage determination, 
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they do not provide an explanation of the male-female wage gap that exists for more 
highly educated men and women. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
APPENDIX A - DATA APPENDIX 
The sample used in this thesis is the National Longitudinal Survey Youth 
(NLSY) cohort, a panel survey of 12,686 young men and women. The survey began 
in 1979 and continues annually. The 12,686 individuals of the NLSY are divided 
into three samples: a random sample, a poverty sample, and a military sample. 
Estimations were performed on the sample of NLSY young men and women over age 
21 from the random sample for interview years 1980-1987. 
In addition to the usual demographic, family, and education data collected in 
such surveys, the NLSY records information on up to five jobs per year held by the 
individual. Detailed information including wage, hours worked, union status, 
industry, and occupation is available for each job. For each worker, I have tracked 
employers across interviews thereby creating a job history as well as a record of job 
turnover for each individual. 
This created job history assures that job-specific variables such as the wage 
and union status are correctly identified with the particular job. It avoids the 
problems that can be created by multiple job holders or job changers if the survey 
records only current information on one job or if no identification of the employer is 
available. The NLSY supplies the necessary information to track job-specific data. It 
should be noted, however, that the work history data supplied directly by the NLSY 
does not automatically track job-specific data with its categorization of jobs as Job #1, 
Job #2, etc. Job #1 in year t may be recorded as Job #2 in year t+ 1. Therefore, 
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DATA APPENDIX 
with the employer identification provided, I have tracked job-specific data across 
interview years. 
In order to create a history of job turnover, it is also necessary to identify the 
"main job" for multiple job holders. The main job was identified as being that job on 
which the worker earned the most during that week. This classification of the main 
job suffers from the disadvantage that a temporary fluctuation in hours worked on a 
secondary job may cause that job to be temporarily classified as the main job. This 
would make it appear that the worker changed jobs during this period when he or she 
did not. Therefore, if a main job was interrupted for a period of one quarter or less, 
it is considered to be the main job throughout the period. A worker's recorded real 
wage in 1979 dollars must also be at least 70% of the minimum wage in 1979 in 
order to be included in the sample. This sample restriction and definition of job 
turnover follow closely that used in Topel [1986]. 
Means of the data are presented in the table below. Tenure is the number of 
years spent with the current employer. Experience is actual labor market experience 
calculated from detailed work history data of the individual up to the interview date. 
The real wage is the worker's wage adjusted by the CPI index so that all wages are in 
terms of 1979 dollars. 
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NLSY Random Sample 
Age ~ 22, 1980-87
Means by Sex and Education Level 
LHSM GHSM LHSF GHSF 
Tenure 1.98 1.67 1.94 1.75 
Experience 5.68 5.58 5.10 5.46 
Bad Health 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03
Dummy 
Union Dummy 0.24 0.13 0.17 0.14 
Real Wage 4.81 5.58 3.81 4.80 
Asset Income 0.20 0.57 0.21 0.37 
Marital Status 0.43 0.29 0.56 0.36
Dummy 
Number of 0.61 0.19 0.85 0.23
Children 
Local 0.56 0.51 0.59 0.52
Unemployment 
Rate > 6% and 
~ 12% 
Local 0.16 0.10 0.14 0.11
Unemployment 
Rate > 12% 
Number of 6018 4336 4792 5064
Observations 
APPENDIX B 33 
TABLES - APPENDIX B 
Table B-1
Second Stage Estimates 
Estimates of m=m,en +mexp
Dependent Variable ln(real wage) - estimated wage growth from 1st stage
Standard Errors in Parentheses* 
LHS GHS LHS GHS
MEN MEN WOMEN WOMEN 
Intercept 0.624 0.342 0.638 0.085
(0.089) (0.129) (0.091) (0.109) 
Initial 0.025 0.073 -0.035 0.025
Experience (0.029) (0.041) (0.026) (0.031) 
Education 0.031 0.035 0.021 0.058
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) 
Bad Health -0.046 -0.218 -0.171 -0.156
Dummy (0.042) (0.050) (0.048) (0.046) 
Married 0.105 0.115 -0.048 0.007
Dummy (0.014) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) 
Union 0.218 0.138 0.130 0.158
Dummy (0.017) (0.023) (0.019) (0.021) 
Northeast 0.013 0.107 0.109 0.100
Region Dummy (0.019) (0.026) (0.023) (0.021) 
South -0.048 0.050 0.007 0.027
Region Dummy (0.016) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) 
West 0.099 0.153 0.150 0.081
Region Dummy (0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.025) 
SMSA 0.120 0.194 0.076 0.121
Dummy (0.016) (0.023) (0.019) (0.020) 
Tenure 0.047 0.038 0.073 0.026
(Coefficient (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012)
is m=m,en +mexp) 
* Standard errors are corrected for two-stage estimation method with the method of
Newey [1984]. See Appendix D for details of covariance correction. 
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Table B-2
Second Stage Estimates
Includes Second Order Effects
Dependent Variable ln(real wage) - estimated wage growth from 1st stage
Standard Errors in Parentheses* 
LHSM GHSM LHSF GHSF 
Intercept 0.475 0.400 0.466 0.060
(0.072) (0.112) (0.086) (0.089) 
Initial 0.079 0.035 0.099 0.022
Experience (0.014) (0.022) (0.015) (0.016) 
Education 0.029 0.0120.035 0.057
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) 
Bad Health -0.038 -0.219 -0.176 -0.154
Dummv (0.042) (0.051) (0.048) (0.046) 
Married 0.104 0.112 -0.043 0.004
Dummy (0.014) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) 
Union 0.216 0.1190.141 0.154
Dummy (0.017) (0.023) (0.019) (0.020) 
Northeast 0.013 0.107 0.099 0.096
Region Dummy (0.019) (0.026) (0.022) (0.021) 
South -0.044 0.051 0.007 0.026
Region Dummy (0.016) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) 
West 0.101 0.153 0.142 0.079
Region Dummy (0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.025) 
SMSA 0.123 0.194 0.080 0.123
(0.016) (0.023) (0.018) (0.020) 
Tenure 0.138 0.034 0.212 0.083
(Coefficient (0.034) (0.048) (0.031) (0.035)
is m=m,,,,, +m~v-) 
Tenure2 -0.006 -0.006 0.000 -0.011(Coefficient (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
is m,_?) 
Experience2 -0.005 0.004 -0.014 0.000(Coefficient (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
ism~,,) 
* Standard errors are corrected for two-stage estimation method with the method of
Newey [1984]. See Appendix D for details of covariance correction. 
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Table B-3
Second Stage Estimates
Including Occupational Dummy Variables
Dependent Variable ln(real wage) - estimated wage growth from 1st stage
Standard Errors in Parentheses* 
LHS GHS LHS GHS
MEN MEN WOMEN WOMEN 
Intercept 0.619 0.553 0.770 0.228
(0.088) (0.129) (0.091) (0.108) 
Initial 0.022 -0.0420.068 0.020
Experience (0.029) (0.041) (0.026) (0.031) 
Education 0.030 0.017 0.005 0.041
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) 
Bad Health -0.055 -0.212 -0.154 -0.161
Dummy (0.041) (0.052) (0.046) (0.046) 
Married 0.095 0.105 -0.047 -0.006
Dummy (0.013) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) 
Union 0.225 0.142 0.163 0.140
Dummy (0.017) (0.023) (0.019) (0.021) 
Northeast 0.008 0.104 0.100 0.111
Region Dummy (0.019) (0.025) (0.022) (0.021) 
South -0.048 0.049 0.002 0.026
Region Dummy (0.016) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) 
West 0.089 0.149 0.148 0.097
Region Dummy (0.023) (0.026) (0.023) (0.025) 
SMSA 0.109 0.166 0.051 0.113
Dummy (0.016) (0.023) (0.018) (0.020) 
Tenure 0.042 0.030 0.059 0.018
(Coefficient is (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012)
m=mlen +mexp) 
White Collar, 0.146 0.232 0.251 0.257
Skilled (0.027) (0.024) (0.019) (0.022) 
White Collar, -0.033 0.019 0.140 0.070
Unskilled (0.022) (0.025) (0.018) (0.022) 
Blue Collar, 0.157 0.2870.140 0.377
Skilled (0.015) (0.031) (0.038) (0.069) 
* Standard errors are corrected for two-stage estimation method with the method of
Newey [1984]. See Appendix D for details of covariance correction. 
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Table B-4
Second Stage Estimates
Including Full-time Work Ratio
Dependent Variable ln(real wage) - estimated wage growth from 1st stage
Standard Errors in Parentheses* 
LHSM GHSM LHSF GHSF 
Intercept 0.511 0.275 0.604 0.053
(0.080) (0.120) (0.090) (0.100) 
Initial 0.009 0.068 -0.075 0.023
Experience (0.032) (0.043) (0.029) (0.033) 
Education 0.029 0.0130.037 0.059
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
Bad Health -0.024 -0.212 -0.162 -0.155
Dummy (0.042) (0.051) (0.046) (0.046) 
Married 0.101 0.116 -0.032 0.008
Dummy (0.014) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) 
Union 0.215 0.138 0.126 0.159
Dummy (0.017) (0.023) (0.019) (0.021) 
Northeast 0.016 0.108 0.105 0.100
Region Dummy (0.019) (0.026) (0.022) (0.021) 
South -0.045 0.049 0.002 0.028
Region Dummy (0.016) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) 
West 0.097 0.155 0.137 0.082
Region Dummy (0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.025) 
SMSA 0.126 0.196 0.070 0.122
(0.016) (0.023) (0.018) (0.020) 
Tenure 0.029 0.032 0.027 0.023
(Coefficient is (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012)
m=mlen +mexp) 
Full-time Work 0.259 0.075 0.457 0.033
Ratio (0.058) (0.058) (0.054) (0.050) 
* Standard errors are corrected for two-stage estimation method with the method of
Newey [1984]. See Appendix D for details of covariance correction. 
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Table B-5 
OLS
by Sex and Education Group
Dependent Variable = ln(real wage)
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
LHSM GHSM LHSF GHSF 
Intercept 0.805 0.901 0.600 0.917
(0.039) (0.054) (0.036) (0.047) 
Tenure 0.098 0.086 0.084 0.126
(0.010) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) 
Tenure-squared -0.008 -0.007 -0.005 -0.016
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Experience 0.081 0.043 0.102 0.021
(0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.016) 
Experience- -0.003 0.001 -0.005 0.002squared (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Union 0.224 0.127 0.122 0.160Dummy (0.016) (0.027) (0.021) (0.022) 
Bad Health -0.034 -0.230 -0.177 -0.166Dummy (0.037) (0.055) (0.034) (0.040) 
Married 0.101 0.112 -0.042 -0.014Dummy (0.013) (0.021) (0.015) (0.016) 
Northeast 0.007 0.100 0.099 0.106· Region Dummy (0.019) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) 
South -0.062 0.045 0.005 0.027Region Dummy (0.016) (0.024) (0.019) (0.020) 
West 0.101 0.131 0.143 0.061Region Dummy (0.020) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) 
SMSA 0.125 0.208 0.078 0.124Dummy (0.015) (0.025) (0.017) (0.021)IR2 I I I I I0.205 0.148 0.189 0.115 
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Table B-6 
OLS 
by Sex and Education Group
Including Occupational Dummy Variables
Dependent Variable = ln(real wage)
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
LHSM GHSM LHSF GHSF 
Intercept 0.791 0.853 0.577 0.816
(0.039) (0.053) (0.036) (0.047) 
Tenure 0.090 0.075 0.070 0.112
(0.010) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) 
Tenure-squared -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.013
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Experience 0.077 0.039 0.087 0.011
(0.013) (0.018) (0.014) (0.016) 
Experience- -0.003 0.001 -0.004 0.003
squared (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Union 0.232 0.140 0.152 0.138
Dummy (0.016) (0.026) (0.020) (0.022) 
Bad Health -0.044 -0.218 -0.160 -0.168
Dummy (0.036) (0.054) (0.033) (0.039) 
Married 0.092 0.102 -0.040 -0.022
Dummy (0.013) (0.020) (0.014) (0.015) 
Northeast 0.003 0.098 0.088 0.116
Region Dummy (0.019) (0.025) (0.022) (0.021) 
South -0.062 0.048 0.002 0.024
Region Dummy (0.016) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019) 
West 0.090 0.138 0.141 0.083
Region Dummy (0.020) (0.025) (0.022) (0.023) 
SMSA 0.113 0.171 0.054 0.114
Dummy (0.015) (0.024) (0.017) (0.020) 
White Collar, 0.149 0.246 0.244 0.280
Skilled (0.024) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) 
White Collar, -0.016 0.023 0.134 0.077
Unskilled (0.022) (0.025) (0.017) (0.021) 
Blue Collar, 0.157 0.138 0.278 0.397
Skilled (0.015) (0.030) (0.049) (0.069)IR2 I 0.229 I 0.188 I I I0.226 0.176 
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Table B-7 
OLS 
by Sex and Education Group
Including Full-time Work Ratio
Dependent Variable = ln(real wage)
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
LHSM GHSM LHSF GHSF 
Intercept 0.798 0.898 0.622 0.923
(0.039) (0.054) (0.036) (0.047) 
Tenure 0.092 0.086 0.073 0.126
(0.010) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) 
Tenure-squared -0.008 -0.007 -0.004 -0.016
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Experience 0.030 0.036 0.015 0.040
(0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) 
Experience-squared 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Union 0.223 0.127 0.123 0.158
Dummy (0.016) (0.027) (0.020) (0.022) 
Bad Health -0.020 -0.227 -0.169 -0.169
Dummy (0.037) (0.055) (0.034) (0.040) 
Married 0.097 -0.0330.113 -0.016
Dummy (0.013) (0.021) (0.015) (0.016) 
Northeast 0.010 0.1010.100 0.104
Region Dummy (0.019) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) 
South -0.061 0.044 0.001 0.026
Region Dummy (0.016) (0.024) (0.018) (0.020) 
West 0.099 0.131 0.136 0.058
Region Dummy (0.020) (0.026) (0.022) (0.023) 
SMSA 0.127 0.209 0.072 0.123
Dummy (0.015) (0.025) (0.017) (0.021) 
Full-time 0.207 0.036 0.341 -0.094
Work Ratio (0.044) (0.048) (0.044) (0.040)
IR2 I 0.209 I 0.149 I 0.201 I I0.117 
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FIRST AND SECOND STAGE ESTIMATES - APPENDIX C 
First stage estimates by sex and 
Cum Rtns to Tenure (Xa)
education group are reported in Estimations by Two-Stage Mefhod
0.3 
Table C-1 below while the second stage 
estimates are found in Table C-2. 
-0.1 
-0.15
0.5 1 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5 6.5Greater detail is provided in the main 2 3 4 5 6 ' 7r...... 
--- LE HS-W - GT HS-W ----- L£ HS-M -a- GT HS-Mtext. Returns are much more similar in 
Figure C-1size for men and women who have 
greater than a high school education. In the case of tenure returns, all men and high 
education women look very similar, while low education women receive a notably 
lower return to tenure (Figure C-1). Note that my estimates for men are smaller and 
the returns flatten out faster than those of Topel [1991] but the estimates found here 
are closer to his than to the very small returns to tenure found by Altonji and 
Shakotko [1987] or Abraham and Farber [1987]. 
Experience profiles differ more 
Cum Rtns to Experience (Xa)
by education level than do tenure Estimations by Two-Stage Method 
profiles, but it is again less educated 
women who differ the most from the 
other groups (Figure C-2). The tenure 
-0.4
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7
Experience 
--- LE HS-W -+- GT HS-W --- tr HS-M -a- GT HS-Mand experience returns depicted in these 
Figure C-2tables and figures is yet another 
illustration of the recurring theme of this paper that more highly educated men and 
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women have very similar labor market outcomes while less educated women have 
very different labor experiences than the other groups. 
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Table C-1
First Stage Estimates of Within-Job Wage Growth
By Sex and Education Level
Dependent Variable=Differenced ln(real wage) 
Sample: Age > 22, 1979-1986
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
LHSM GHSM LHSF GHSF 
Tenure* 0.036 0.089 -0.028 0.065
(0.030) (0.042) (0.027) (0.031) 
Tenure2 -0.023 -0.013 -0.048 -0.043
(x 10) (0.024) (0.042) (0.028) (0.034) 
Experience2 0.014 -0.022 0.087 0.016
(x 10) (0.026) (0.037) (0.027) (0.029) 
Weeks of Company -0.0004 0.003 -0.004 0.004
Training** (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Weeks of Off- -0.0002 0.004 -0.004 0.004
the-Job Training** (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
* Includes returns to tenure and experience.
** Weeks of training include only training received during the course of the current job tenure. 
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Table C-2 
Second Stage Estimates
By Sex and Education Group
Dependent Variable=
ln(real wage) - estimated wage growth from 1st stage 
Sample: Age > 22, 1979-1986
Standard Errors in Parentheses* 
LHSM GHSM LHSF GHSF 
Intercept 0.695 0.442 0.623 0.190
(0.093) (0.140) (0.095) (0.120) 
Initial 0.006 0.061 -0.059 0.017
Experience (0.031) (0.042) (0.027) (0.032) 
Eduyation 0.037 0.034 0.039 0.055
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) 
Bad Health -0.068 -0.223 -0.190 -0.164
(0.043) (0.051) (0.048) (0.046) 
Married 0.139 0.144 -0.036 0.020
Dummy (0.015) (0.022) (0.016) (0.017) 
Union 0.245 0.143 0.174 0.166
Dummy (0.017) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) 
Northeast 0.015 0.111 0.110 0.100
Dummy (0.019) (0.026) (0.024) (0.022) 
South -0.053 0.046 -0.009 0.026
Dummy (0.017) (0.024) (0.020) (0.019) 
West 0.084 0.148 0.130 0.079
Dummy (0.024) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025) 
SMSA 0.122 0.200 0.083 0.123
Dummy (0.016) (0.023) (0J)19) (0.020) 
* Standard errors are corrected for two-stage estimation method with the method of Newey
[1984]. See Appendix D for details of covariance correction. 
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COVARIANCE CORRECTION - APPENDIX D 
The covariance matrix for the two-stage estimates reported in this paper were 
calculated using the method of Newey [1984]. Newey shows that the covariance 
matrix of such second stage estimates can be estimated with the method of moments. 
Let Z be the matrix of first stage explanatory variables and X be the matrix of 
explanatory variables for the second stage. The first stage coefficients are contained 
in the [rxl] vector {3 and those for the second stage in the [sxl] vector A. The second 
stage estimator for A, ~, also uses one or more of the estimates obtained in the first 
stage, ~. 
Let the first stage moment condition that defines ~ be: 
(D-1) 
And the second stage moment condition defining ~ : 
N n 
A --lL h(X ,/3,A)=O. (D-2)
n 
Bh.
Let HA= E[-'], i,k=l, ... ,s. Hp and Gp are analogous to HA. Let Vhh =BAk 
E[h(X,{3,A) * h(X,B,A)1. Vgg and Vgh are analogous to Vhh. Let the variance-
covariance matrix of ~ be O A. Newey shows that 
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(D-3) 
n >. =H>. -1vhJiH >. -1 +H >. -1H {J [G{J -1v g g G{J -11H{J'H>. -1'-H>. -1[H{JG{J -1vgh +vhg G{J -1H {J 11 JH -1 >. " 
Note that the first term, H>--1VhhH>--i, is the variance of ~, had {3 been known and not 
estimated in the first stage. 
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